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3 WORDS FOR PARTS OF THE BODY
Asifa Majid
The human body like any other object is per-
ceived through our senses, but it is unique in
that it alone is internally as well as externally
apprehended. It serves as a special focus of
attention. It is ritually dressed and adorned in
a variety of ways in different cultures-from
tattoos, piercings, and scarification to plastic
surgery and make-up. It is widely regarded as
the source for many of our concepts, particu-
larly in relation to space, time, and emotions.
Yet comparatively little attention is paid to the
basic vocabulary for the body.
The body appears to be a discrete and
independent semantic domain in memory.
Neuropsychological studies show that in
both production and comprehension, lexical-
semantic knowledge of body parts can be
relatively preserved (Coslett, Saffran, &
SchwoebeL 2002; Shelton, Fouch, &
Caramazza, 1998) or impaired (Dennis, 1976;
Suzuki, Yamadori, & Fuji, 1997) in comparison
to other semantic domains. Imaging studies
also provide converging evidence that there
are distinct cortical areas responsible for pro-
cessing semantic knowledge of body parts,
regardless of input modality (written, spoken)
or language (for English-French bilinguals; see
Le Clec'H et aL 2000). Shelton, Fouch, &
Caramazza (1998; Caramazza & Shelton,
1998) have speculated that as a result of evolu-
tionary pressures, body parts might be a spe-
cialized module neurally and functionally.
According to their account, semantic represen-
tations are organized into domains because
there have been specific adaptations to quickly
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classify and respond to objects relevant for
survival value. The body would be one of
these domains because body parts playa key
role in interacting with the environment-
"hands for grasping, legs for movement, eyes
for seeing, mouths for ingesting, etc." (Shelton
et aL 1998, p. 348). In ~ddition to the evolu-
tionary arguments, developmental evidence
suggests that the body is special. Infants less
than an hour old imitate facial movements
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1983), and within a few
weeks they can even imitate simple manual
gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), suggesting
an innate ability to perceive and interpret body
parts.
The ontogenetic data and evolutionary
arguments, along with evidence from percep-
tion that will be reviewed, suggest a funda-
mental categorization of the body into parts
-i.e., into head, hands, arms, feet, legs, etc.
The question addressed in this chapter is
whether there are "basic" body parts that are
recognized across cultures in how people talk
about the body. Or to put it another way, how
do people from different communities come to
conceptualize the body in the languages they
speak? Are the terms for parts of the body
across the world's languages the same or dif-
ferent? And are there constraints on naming; if
so, what are these constraints?
The particular semantic component on
which I focus is the reference of body part
terms, that is, what is the exact extension of
body part terms across languages; how similar
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FIGURE 3.1. In visual perception the human body
is represented by a three-dimensional
hierarchical model (A-e) consisting of a series of
cylinders.
values, and after a number of processing stages
this results in a three-dimensional model that
is hierarchical in structure. The model for the
human body consists of a number of general-
ized cylinders or cones. At the highest level of
granularity the whole body can be represented
as a single cylinder. At the next level the head,
trunk, arms, and legs would each be repre-
sented by a separate cylinder. Then the arms
and legs would further be subdivided into
smaller cylinders, corresponding to upper-
arm, lower-arm, upper-leg, and lower-leg,
etc. (see Figure 3.1). In Biederman's (1987)
formulation, these parts would be referred to
as geons, and the head would be represented as
a sphere, rather than a cylinder. 1
Discussions about "natural" segments of
the body have privileged vision over the
other senses; however consideration of addi-
tional senses is highly pertinent to the issue of
a perceptual partitioning of the body. As
discussed in the introduction, the body is
uniquely apprehended, being an object of
internal perception through proprioception
and somesthetic inputs, as well as an object of
external perception through vision. Current
psychological research takes it for granted that
body parts named in language reflect the "true"
and unique partitioning of the body (Schwoebel
& Coslett, 2005; Sirigu, Grafman, Bressler, &
Sunderland, 1991). But this may be too sim-
plistic. There is now an emerging literature
on how body parts are represented and organized
cBA
This is but one component of this semantic
domain. According to Kemmerer and
Tranel (2008), additional components include
information about the spatial organization of
body parts, their characteristic functions, and
their typical cultural associations. Although we
may expect differences between languages in
characteristic functions or cultural associations
of body parts, many have predicted universals in
body part categorization. I argue in this chapter
that there is considerably more variation in the
naming of body parts than is acknowledged, but
that this variation is constrained.
BODY PARTS IN PERCEPTION
A dominant view held by many psychologists,
linguists, and anthropologists is that body part
categories are "given" by visual perceptual dis-
continuities, and that words are merely labels for
these predetermined parts (e.g., Andersen, 1978;
Biederman, 1987; Brown, 1976; Lakoff, 1987).
The mapping is taken to be straightforward and
obvious. There is one salient partitioning of the
body into parts and all a speaker has to do is to
identify which of these parts is associated with
which particular label in their own language.
In many current theories of object recogni-
tion, objects are represented by parts
(Biederman, 1987; Hoffman & Richards, 1984;
Marr, 1982). Theories differ in detail, such
as whether objects are segmented according
to general purpose geometric constraints
(Hoffman & Richards, 1984; Singh,
Seyranian, & Hoffman, 1999; Xu & Singh,
2002) or into volumetric parts corresponding
to shape primitives (e.g., Biederman, 1987;
Marr & Nishihara, 1978). Nonetheless, there
is consensus on core points: namely, that
objects are segmented at discontinuities, and
that there is a nested hierarchy of partitions,
with parts lower in the hierarchy being smaller
than parts higher in the hierarchy (Hoffman &
Richards, 1984; Marr, 1982; Marr & Nishihara,
1978; Palmer, 1977).
For the human body these theories come to
the same segmentation. According to Marr
(1982), for example, visual processing begins
with an image that has an array of intensity
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in different perceptual modalities, as well as how
these sensorial representations are pooled
together to create an integrated and holistic
representation of the body and its parts (de
Vignemont, Majid, Jolla, & Haggard, 2009;
de Vignemont, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2005).
Although there are some common principles in
how partonomies are derived in different repre-
sentational systems, there may not be one unique
partitioning of the body into parts, but multiple
partonomies subserving different functions.
The skin, for example, is a continuous undif-
ferentiated sheet, but the primary somatosen-
sory cortex has receptive fields that generally
follow neuroanatomical divisions, such as finger
and arm. Nonetheless, these categorical divi-
sions are the result of our cumulative experi-
ences and are highly malleable. They can
become blurred under certain types of tactile
experience. Braille readers, for example, who
move multiple adjacent fingers simultaneously
to read dot patterns raised on a surface show
"smearing" of the neural representation of their
digits. When asked to identify which finger is
being touched in a psychophysical task, they
make many more confusion errors between fin-
gers, consistent with the topographical disar-
rangement of the cortex (Sterr et al., 1998a,b).
These results are not due to a loss of sensitivity
as demonstrated by the fact that the same people
have lower tactile thresholds (i.e., higher sensi-
tivity) than controls when asked to indicate
merely when they have been touched (Sterr
et aI., 1998a,b). Similar results of cortical reor-
ganization and digit mislocalization have been
found for normal participants who have had
finger and thumb simultaneously stimulated
for an hour a day over a 4-week period (Braun,
Schweizer, Elbert, Birbaumer, & Taub, 2000).
Action provides another basis for body part
segmentation. Intentional action imposes a
functional, as opposed to a spatial, organization
to body parts. If I raise my arm, my hand
follows. But if you tap me on my arm, this
does not tell me anything about the sensation
in my hand. So the tactile partonomy and
motor partonomy appear to give rise to dif-
ferent representations of body parts. For
example, tactile perception exhibits a catego-
rical boundary effect. When two tactile stimuli
are applied to a single body part (hand or arm),
those points are perceived to be closer together
than when the two points are presented across
body parts (one point on the hand and the
other on the arm). However, if participants
are made to move their hands (by flexing and
extending the wrist joint), the category
boundary effect is attenuated. The distance
between the hand and arm is perceived to be
closer than when the parts were static (de
Vignemont et al., 2009). Overall, then, action
appears to unify discrete parts.
Different partonomies, thus, exist for dif-
ferent representational systems-visual, soma-
tosensory, motor--each of which is more or
less differentiated and more or less malleable.
Nevertheless, in all the systems, joints appear to
be landmarks for segmentation of the body. As
Bermudez (1998, p. 156) argues: "Individual
body parts are paradigmatically defined in
terms of hinges. The forearm, for example, is
the volume between the elbow and the wrist ...
Using hinges provides a nonarbitrary way of
segmenting the body that accords pretty closely
with how we classify body parts in everyday
thought and speech." Or as Bloom (2000,
p. 109) says: "objects are parsed into natural
parts through a sensitivity to discontinuities in
surface contour ... A finger, for instance, is an
excellent part because unpleasant as it is to
think about-it is seen as having a potential
separateness from the rest of the body, in that
it can be cleanly severed." Vision provides a
more nuanced, hierarchical structure, but in
general the senses appear to be aligned in their
defaul t segmentational strategies.
So what can we predict about how languages
label these perceptual parts? Figure 3.1 provides a
good basis to layout the possibility space for how
languages name the body and its parts. Beginning
with level A, the classic review articles on nomen-
clature for the body by Brown (1976) and
Andersen (1978) propose that the geon on this
level, i.e., the BODY, will be universally labeled.
The next level-level B-is often taken as
the "basic level" as illustrated in this quote from
Tversky (1989, pp. 993-994): "an extraterres-
trial being, with a cognitive system similar to
ours, may, in trying to comprehend Homo









trunk, arms, and legs." The notion of a basic
level for parts (as opposed to kinds) is proble-
matic, but has a certain utility here in order to
test hypotheses about naming patterns cross-
linguistically. For example, Andersen (1978)
has claimed that all languages will label HEAD,
TRUNK, ARM (and HAND), and LEG (and FOOT) (see
also Brown 1976 and Wierzbicka, 2007). The
content in parentheses is informative here,
since it already suggests a variation in naming
across languages--that "There is not always
exact correspondence across languages for the
reference of a given term" (Andersen, 1978,
p. 351). At the next level, level C, we can ask
whether languages name the UPPER-ARM, LOWER-
ARM, HAND, UPPER-LEG, LOWER-LEG, and FOOT with
distinct terms. According to the most simplistic
hypothesis every visually segmented body part
would be named in language. This could be read
from claims such as made by Hoffman and
Richards (1984): "It is probably no accident
that the parts defined by minima are often
easily assigned verbal labels" (p. 82).
In the next section, I will illustrate how
languages differ in which parts they single
out for naming. Nevertheless, naming of
body parts is not unconstrained by the seg-
mentations provided by perception, a point to
which we will come back in the final section.
VARIAnON OF BODY PART CATEGORIES
ACROSS LANGUAGES
Before examining how well words across the
world's languages map onto perceptually
derived parts of the body, some thought
needs to be given as to what sorts of linguistic
units we wish to consider. At the heart of the
problem is the fact that the same referential
entity can be expressed in language in different
ways. Within a single language choice of
expression can convey a different perspective,
for example, the family dog could felicitously
be referred to as "Rover, the family pet, our
dog, Tim's pup, the rubbish-bin, the destroyer
of shoes, or even the vacuum-cleaner" (Clark,
1997, p. 2); however not all of these expres-
sions are on par; rather some seem to be more
fundamental or "basic."
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For example, in Tarascan (spoken in Mexico)
one common way to talk about body parts is
through a set of suffixes. These provide infor-
mation regarding the spatial relationship
between objects and can be used to describe
the location of an experience. For example, the
verb root p'ame 'feel pain, ache' can be com-
bined with different body part suffixes to
express where the pain is felt, p'ame-cha-ni
'to feel pain in the throat', p'ame-k'u-rha-ni
'to feel pain in the hand(s)', p'ame-a-rha-ni
'to feel pain in the stomach', p'ame-ndi-ni 'to
feel pain in the earls)', p'ame-t'a-rha-ni 'to feel
pain in the leg(s)', p'ame-!1arhi-ni 'to feel pain
in the face or eyes', etc. (Friedrich, 1971;
Mendoza, 2007). Tarascan is not unique in
having such a set of body part morphemes.
Body part verb suffixes appear in Totanac
(Levy, 1999), and there are verb prefixes in
North American languages for doing things
'by hand', 'by foot', etc.
One interesting thing about these body part
suffixes is that they can have unusual refer-
ents. For example, the nose and forehead are
conflated under a single suffix,-lU in Tarascan,
which leads Andersen (1978) to claim that in
this language the term for nose includes the
forehead. But Tarascan also has a distinct noun
that refers to the nose and another for forehead
(Lathrop, 2007). In fact, there appears to be a
dual semantic system for body part categoriza-
tion in Tarascan and the other languages
above: one that is expressed in nouns and
another more schematic one that is expressed
in grammaticalized morphemes. For a com-
plete perspective of how languages categorize
body parts, it would be important to consider
these non-nouns also. For now, though, we
ask the simpler question of how nouns in dif-
ferent languages categorize body parts, with
the goal of examining whether they partition
the body in the same way across languages.
Literally descriptive expressions, such as the
right foot or the back of the knee, in which
the meaning of the whole is a direct combina-
tion of the meaning of the parts, will be
excluded from consideration. Rather, the
focus will be on expressions that are conven-
tionalized. This would include complex expres-
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whole meaning is not descriptive. For example,
underarm in English is decomposable into
under plus arm, but the meaning of this
phrase is not predictable, as can be seen by
the fact that it means ARMPIT in English but
the cognate onderarm in Dutch means
FOREARM.
Having established what words we will be
comparing, the question then, is whether all
languages have a term to refer to the parts at
every level of the part hierarchy in Figure 3.17
Recall that Andersen (1978), Brown (1976),
and others propose that (1) all languages will
label level A, the BODY, (2) all languages should
label HEAD, TRUNK, ARM, and LEG in level B
because these are "basic" parts, and (3) UPPER-
ARM, LOWER-ARM, HAND, UPPER-LEG, LOWER-LEG,
and fOOT should receive distinct labels since
they are parts defined by minima.
To be able to determine whether languages
have terms for the body parts listed above,
detailed descriptions of body part naming sys-
tems from geographically, genealogically, and
typologically distinct languages are required.
By ensuring a broad and diverse language
sample, we can be more confident that any
generalizations discovered hold beyond the
particular languages studied. Detailed descrip-
tions are required because consulting a dic-
tionary or word list from a grammar will
often not provide enough information to
establish the exact meaning of a term. For
these reasons, a concerted effort was made to
provide detailed descriptions of body part
terminology at the Language and Cognition
group, Max Planck Institute for Psycholin-
guistics (Majid, Enfield, & van Staden, 2006).
A team of field researchers used a standardized
battery of linguistic tests to collect information
about body part terminologies in a broad
sample of languages (see Table 3.1). The lan-
guages studied were mostly from small-scale
"traditional" societies (with the exception of
Punjabi and American Sign Language).
Researchers were experts on the languages:
they were either speakers of the languages
described themselves or had conducted long-
term linguistic and ethnographic work on the
language communities. There are two main
advantages of this method of data collection:
(1) because the same battery of tests is used in
different languages, maximal comparabiJity is
ensured, and (2) because language experts con-
duct the study in different settings, language-
specific nuances are more likely to be detected
and can therefore be respected in the compara-
tive endeavor.
In the following sections, I will draw pri-
marily on these languages and consider each of
the above proposed claims of body part naming
in turn.
Proposal 1: All Languages Will Label the Body
This is not a universal. There are languages
that do not have a term for BODY, the leftmost
cylinder in Figure 3.1, on the highest level of
the perceptual hierarchy. That is, there is not a













































term that refers to the uniquely physical
appearance-as opposed to the social dimen-
sion-of a person. This is the case in Tidore, a
Papuan language spoken on the island of
Tidore in the North Moluccas. In Tidore, the
term mansia, which could be used to refer to
level A, has a wider scope, meaning 'person' or
'human being' (van Staden, 2006). This
appears to be a common pattern, and has been
reported for Tiriyo, spoken in the northern
Amazonia (Meira, 2006) and Kuuk
Thaayorre, spoken on the west coast of Cape
York, Australia (Gaby, 2006; see also Wilkins,
1996; Evans & Wilkins, 2001).
These reported counterexamples have been
challenged by Wierzbicka (2007; d. Goddard,
2001), who claim that in these languages, the
term for 'person' is polysemous, with one
sense referring to the physical body and
another sense to the person. If we accept this
argument, then the universaJ of naming of the
body could be upheld and Proposal (1) would
remain intact. Since this is a crucial point, let
us consider the argument more closely.
Both Wierzbicka and Goddard suggest that
if the same word has distinct interpretations in
different syntactic constructions then that
word must have distinct senses stored in the
mental lexicon. But distinct interpretations can
be generated on the fly (i.e., pragmatically
generated), rather than stored as separate lex-
icalized entries. For the languages cited, there
could be a general meaning corresponding
roughly to 'person', with 'body' being under-
stood within a specific situation. Ordinarily,
however, a general interpretation would be
sufficient for communication-for example,
Evans and Wilkins (2001) describe how
Arrente-English bilingual speakers translated
a notice on diabetes, which in English read "all
these things are bad for the body," to "thing
this all bad tyerrtye (= 'person/body')." There
is no need to specify further-a general inter-
pretation is sufficient-since what is good/bad
for the body is good/bad for the person. They
conclude that "the distinction berween the
'body' sense and the 'person' sense of Arrente
tyerrtye becomes blurred (and is inconsequen-
tial for adequate comprehension)" (Evans &
Wilkins, 2001, p. 502). Or to take an example
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from a different domain: When I use the word
bird any member of the category could be
meant (it is a general term), but a specific
member might be inferred in the right context
(e.g., I saw a bird stick its head in the sand =
ostrich). This does not mean that the meaning
of bird is polysemous. In the same way, we
could say that tyerrtye is not polysemous.
Wierzbicka and Goddard argue that a poly-
semous interpretation is necessary unless a
unitary definition-which can account for the
range of the word's usages-ean be provided.
Critically, they require that the unitary defini-
tion should be a paraphrase in natural lan-
guage. 2 This is the cornerstone of the Natural
Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach,
according to which all word meanings can be
defined by a set of simpler words-"primes"-
that are innate, universaL and themselves not
definable (Wierzbicka 1972, 1996; Goddard,
Chapter 4, this volume). This insistence on a
single definition in natural language comes
only from practitioners of NSM; it is not a
generally accepted requirement. Meaning as
reduction to simpler components is not
widely accepted in the cognitive and linguistic
sciences today; rather many take an "embodi-
ment" or "simulation" viewpoint instead (e.g.,
Barsalou, 1999; see Kemmerer, Chapter 14,
this volume). The fact is that in ordinary
usage of language it may not be necessary to
have a distinctly lexicalized expression for
BODY, as the above example from Arrente
demonstrates.
In Tidore there is no indigenous word for
BODY but speakers can use the Indonesian loan
word badan 'body' to specify the purely phy-
sical component. Whereas many would
take the borrowing as evidence for an existing
lexical gap in the language, Goddard (2001,
p.1S) argues that "some languages have bor-
rowed terms for semantic primes, presumably
replacing the earlier indigenous words." So,
the argument goes, Tidore did have a term for
body but just replaced it with a new word
from Indonesian. It is hard to see why a
single body part term would be borrowed (if
there was no gap), particularly since other
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The crux of Wierzbicka and Goddard's
objections to abandoning Proposal 1 is that
within NSM no distinction is drawn between
semantic and conceptual representations. The
BODY is viewed as a conceptual universal and to
deny that a language has a word meaning
'body' is to deny that the language community
has the concept BODY. But this conclusion fol-
lows only if we conflate linguistic meaning
with non linguistic representations; we can
deny that there is a specific word with the
semantics 'body' without denying that a
person could entertain that concept. Speakers
of languages such as Tidore, Tiriy6, and Kuuk
Thaayorre do not have words for the body, but
that does not entail that they do not have the
concept BODY.
Proposal 2: All Languages Will Label the
"Basic" Parts HEAD, TRUNK, ARM, and LEG
After the BODY, the next level of the hierarchy in
Figure 3.1 has the major subdivisions of the
body. This level may conceivably be thought
of as the "basic" level, or the level with the
most salient parts (Tversky, 1989). Do lan-
guages label each of these generalized cones?
On one version of this hypothesis, there
would be separate words for each of the
cones present. No theorist predicts this, of
course, since symmetrical parts are not
expected to be lexicalized distinctly.
Nevertheless, distinct words for the HEAD,
TRUNK, ARMS, and LEGS may be expected to
exist in every language of the world, but do
not.
Jahai, an Aslian language of Malaysia
(Burenhult, 2006), does not have a term for
the head. The closest contender is the term
kuy, which in every day discourse refers to
the top part of the head, not the whole general-
ized cone. We may wonder if this is just an
idiosyncratic lexical gap in this language, but
the lack of a term for head seems to be consis-
tently absent in many other Aslian languages,
including Semelai, Mah Meri, and Ceq Wong
(N. Kruspe, personal communication).
Jahai kuy (and its cognates in the languages
above) is the closest equivalent to head because
if someone is beheaded this would be the term
that would be used to refer to the disembodied
head. But this usage is most probably a case of
metonymic extension since all other evidence
confirms the word has a much narrower sense
than HEAD. When speakers of Jahai, Semelai,
and the other Aslian languages are asked to
color in the head on a line drawing of a body
they color only that part of the head that is
covered with hair. Corpus evidence also sup-
ports a narrower sense for the head term. For
example, when aMah Meri speaker says bad?
kal 'look.through head' it means to look
through someone's hair for lice or dandruff
and tJe kay 'cut head' means to cut someone's
hair, not behead someone.4
Moving to the next "basic" part-the
TRUNK-it appears that this body part is not
highly salient for naming purposes. Many lan-
guages, such as Jahai, Tiriy6, Tidore, Punjabi,
and Savosavo (a Papuan language spoken on
the Solomon Islands), lack a distinct term for
the trunk. Commonly-across languages-the
same term is used for torso as for the whole
body, as is the case in Yell Dnye, for example.
It is much rarer to find a distinct term for the
torso alone, although it does happen (e.g.,
Kuuk Thaayorre rerngk). A closer look at the
exact meaning of the trunk terms reveals
further fine-grained differences between lan-
guages. For example, when speakers of Yell
Dnye are asked to construct a partonomy of
the body, under the 'trunk' sense of pM they
include chest, belly, and buttocks (Levinson,
2006). English speakers, on the other hand,
do not consider the buttocks to be part of the
torso but part of the legs instead.
Terms for LEGS and ARMS likewise show con-
siderable variation across languages.
Lavukaleve (another Papuan language of the
Solomon Islands) has one general term for
ARMS and LEGS, thus categorizing together spa-
tially discontinuous parts (Terrill, 2006). This
term is somewhat reminiscent of English limb,
but unlike English there is no other specific
word to refer to the arm or leg, respectivelys
Lavukaleve contradicts previous claims that
the arm and leg are always given distinct
terms (Andersen, 1978; Brown, 1976).
At the other extreme, Jahai has a very fine-












lacks terms for ARMS and LEGS at the "basic"
level of the hierarchy. There are no superordi-
nate terms, as found in Lavukaleve, but also no
distinct terms for ARMS and LEGS separately.
Jahai has a much more fine-grain categoriza-
tion system for the limbs, as will be discussed
in the next section.
For languages that do have terms for ARM
and LEG, one issue that remains to be deter-
mined is whether these words refer to the
whole geon in level B of Figure 3.1, or whether
they have a more restricted range. The issue is
whether HAND and FOOT are included in the
referential range of ARM and LEG: Does arm in
English end at the wrist and leg at the ankle, or
do they extend to include the extremities?
We'll come back to this issue in a later section.
To summarize, it appears that there is not a
universal "basic level" for body parts that
includes HEAD, TRUNK, ARMS, and LEGS. The closest
equivalents to these terms can have differing
extensional ranges, and the first level of categor-
ization of the body can be more generaL for
example, collapsing the distinction between
ARMS and LEGS or more specific, as in the Jahai
system. The next section examines whether all
parts defined by minima are named across
languages.
Proposal 3: Parts Defined by Minima, e.g.,
UPPER-ARM, LOWER-ARM, HAND, UPPER-LEG, LOWER-
LEG, and FOOT, Will Be Named in Languages
As just mentioned, there are languages, such
as Jahai, that name the limbs at a fine level of
granularity with separate terms for UPPER-ARM,
LOWER-ARM, HAND, UPPER-LEG, LOWER-LEG, and
FOOT. Recall that Jahai lacks a term for HEAD
and TRUNK too. The language system favors
naming at a finer level across the board for
body parts (Burenhult, 2006). Granularity of
naming is not always consistent within a lan-
guage, however. In Hopi, for example, there
are discrete terms for UPPER-LEG (qd:si), LOWER-
LEG (hdkya), and FOOT (kiikii), as in Jahai, but
HAND-ARM receives a single label (md:?a), with
no further elaboration (Swanson &
Witkowski, 1977). Similarly, in yell Dnye
there are more distinctions made for the
lower body than the upper body 6 But
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different again from Jahai and Hopi, while
the UPPER-LEG is singled out for naming, the
LOWER LEG and FOOT distinction is collapsed
under a single term.
Perhaps the most salient discontinuities to be
recognized at this level of granularity are those
distinguishing HAND and FOOT. The discontinu-
ities are as salient for their functional signifi-
cance as for their perceptual distinctness: hands
for manipulating objects; feet for walking. Two-
thirds of the world's languages have a distinct
word for HAND. But the remaining one-third
does not make this distinction, collapsing HAND
and ARM or HAND and LOWER ARM (Brown, 2005;
Witkowski & Brown, 1985). Where HAND and
ARM are not distinguished, the proper analysis
may be that the whole upper limb geon in level
B is named, but the HAND geon in level C is not
distinctly labeled. Or to put it another way, the
HAND geon in level C is not singled out as a
distinct part in linguistic categorization. This is
the case in Savosavo (Wegener, 2006). The
word kakau is general over hand-arm. If
someone says that they broke the kakau or
that their kakau is dirty it could refer to any
part of the geon in level B (see also Liston, 1972,
on Serbo-Croatian).
As with body/person, Wierzbicka (2007)
has argued that words such as kakau are poly-
semous between 'arm' and 'hand'; there are
two distinct senses. Her argument is that
since hand is a crucial concept required to
explicate many other word meanings, such as
slap, stroke, and tear, it must be universally
lexicalized. In fact, to perform any of these
actions requires not just the hand but the
whole hand-arm? AJthough English speakers
associate such verbs with the hand (Maouene,
Hidaka, & Smith, 2008), in motor terms the
hand-arm is a single coordinated entity that
achieves the action. Logically, then, there is
no reason why the unified hand-arm could
not be used to explicate "manual" actions.
Or, where required, more specific parts could
be recruited: slap could be done with the palm
and tear and stroke with the fingers, etc. To be
able to distinguish these accounts requires
careful investigation and experimentation.
There are further subtle differences within
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precisely which perceptual geon is selected.
Punjabi and Dutch speakers both have distinct
terms for hand and ann (and foot and leg), but
exhibit divergent intuitions about the relation-
ship between these parts. Punjabi speakers are
clear that the hand is not part of the ann and
the foot is not included in the leg, but Dutch
speakers are not so sure about this. Some
Dutch speakers include the hand within the
scope of the arm term whereas others exclude
it (and likewise with the leg-foot). A similar
situation exists in English. According to some
tests hand appears to be included in the
meaning of arm--one can say that the hand
is part of arm or an arm has a hand. But
according to other tests hand is not integral to
the meaning of ann, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing example: A: Did you find the arm? B:
Yes, but the hand was missing. B: Yes, but the
forearm was missing (Cruse, 1986).8
PRINCIPLES OF BODY PART
CATEGORIZATfON ACROSS LANGUAGES
Although the same visual partonomy (i.e., the
full set of "geons") in Figure 3.1 is percep-
tually available to speakers of different lan-
guages, not all of them-or even some
subset-is universally singled out for the pur-
poses of linguistic categorization. Lavukaleve
and Jahai, for example, represent two very
different solutions for how to refer to the
arms and legs; in the former language only a
general word exists to refer to the limbs,
whereas in Jahai there are no "basic" terms.
Instead LIPPER-ARM, LOWER-ARM, HAND, UPPER-
LEG, LOWER-LEG, and FOOT are all distinctly
labeled. English has distinct terms for ARM
and LEG versus HAND and FOOT, whereas
Savosavo has only general words for ARM-
HAND and LEG-FOOT. Speakers of Yeli Dnye
have a distinct word for UPPER-LEG and another
word for LOWER-LEG-FOOT. And so on. Naming
at each one of the levels of the hierarchy seems
to be an independent choice, as can be seen
from Figure 3.2. Whereas Lavukaleve names
at the "superordinate" level and Jahai at the
"subordinate" level, speakers of Punjabi have
conventionalized expressions at all levels.
Universals in body part naming are not to
be found in the precise parts that are labeled
then. But perhaps discontinuities provide con-
straints in how body part words can refer to the
world. Rather than geons waiting to be labeled
by body part words, perhaps words select pos-
sible extensions and the word's potential refer-
ence is delimited by the boundaries in the
perceptual field. This would mean that body
part terms may vary in the precise extension
they have, but they should never defy the
discontinuities provided by perception. This
proposal is not an obvious fact. van Staden
(2006), for example, argues that in Tidore the
'leg' term in Tidore, yohu, begins at the foot
but ends three-quarters of the way up the
thigh, where there is no perceptual disconti-
nuity in the body image. Despite the lack of a
natural boundary, there may be some other
perceptually salient feature at play here.
Perhaps Tidore speakers wear shorts or skirts
that end at the mid-thigh and the clothing thus
creates an artificial perceptual boundary. Alas
this is not the case. Tidore speakers wear sar-
ongs that come down at least to the knee. van
Staden suggests that the boundary of yohu is
not a physical one but a social or moral one-
the boundary of yohu marks the beginning of
the taboo genital area. So it is an empirical
question as to what extent perceptual bound-
aries constrain the reference of body part
words across languages.
Given that joints play such a fundamental
role in our visual, tactile, and motor represen-
tations of the body, the possibility that they
may not in our semantic representation of the
body is striking. To investigate this possibility
further and find the precise mapping of body
part words onto the body, my colleagues and I
used a very simple method to establish the
extension of body part terms in different lan-
guages. We asked a number of speakers from a
wide array of languages to color in a selection
of body part terms from their own language
(van Staden & Majid, 2006). Figure 3.3 shows
the outcome of the coloring-in task when
speakers of Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian
were asked to color in the arm.
It is important to know that the three lan-




















FIGURE 3.2. Grayscale rendition of Color Plate 1 illustrating three different languages and how they
name parts of the body (A-C). See Color Plate 1 for interpretation. A gray geon means that there is no
conventionalized means for talking about that body part. So. for example. in ]ahai there is no word for
HEAD. TRUNK. ARM, or LEG. Within a language. geons with the same color are referred to with the same
word. Thus Lavukaleve speakers use tau to refer to ARM a.nd LEG. Note that while Lavukalave names
body parts at level B, Jahai names at level C, and Punjabi names at all levels suggesting that naming of
geons at each level of the hierarchy is an independent choice.
limbs. Dutch, like English, has distinct words
for HAND, ARM, FOOT, and LEG. Japanese distin-
guishes HAND from ARM but has a single term
covering FOOT-LEG. Indonesian is less differen-
tiating again and has a single term for HAND--
ARM and another for FOOT-LEG. For all of these
body parts, speakers colored in parts largely
respecting the perceptual discontinuities pro-
vided by the joints. Most Indonesian speakers
colored in from the fingertips to the shoulder
joint; some colored in only the hand to the
wrist, suggesting that hand is the primary
meaning of tangan for them. Japanese speakers




















FIGURE 3.3. Grayscale rendition of Color Plate 2. See Color Plate 2 for interpretation. Eight Dutch,
Japanese, and Indonesian speakers were asked to color in parts of the body. Their responses were then
layered into a single image so that points of consensus could be viewed. The darker the image, the more
speakers colored in that part of the body; the lighter the image, the fewer who included that part. These
are the results when Dutch speakers were asked to color in the arm, Japanese speakers the ude, and
Indonesian speakers the tangan.
Remember, Japanese distingllished HAND from
ARM with distinct terms. In their coloring in,
only one speaker induded the HAND in the exten-
sion of ude, the term for ARM. Most colored
from wrist to shoulder, one or two colored from
elbow to shoulder, and one or two others showed
no dear adherence to the joints as landmarks.
Dutch speakers showed a split pattern in their
coloring; half colored from fingertips to the
shoulder and half from the wrist to the shoulder.
So even though Dutch has a distinct term for HAND,
many speakers think that the HAND is induded in
the reference of ann. The notable result from this
is that despite variations in how many lexical
distinctions are made in the language, speakers
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The composite pictures in Figure 3.3 gra-
phically illustrate how participants respect
boundaries at joints. These figures were cre-
ated by superimposing all the pictures colored-
in to the translation-equivalent of arm by
speakers of the three languages. Remember
that Dutch and Japanese have distinct terms
for arm and hand, whereas Indonesian has a
single hand-arm term. Regardless of this dif-
ference, speakers from all three languages
colored up to the shoulder joint and down to
either the wrist or the fingertips.
These results support the claim that joints
constitute delimitation points for the exten-
sion of body part terms. Regularities in body
part naming come not from which geons are
selected for reference. Instead granularity and
depth of naming of body parts differ across
languages, with perception helping to provide
constraints on the precise reference of the
terms.
CONCLUSIONS
Faced with the variable mapping of lan-
guage onto the body, it could be concluded
that body part categories expressed in lan-
guage are not formed on a perceptual basis.
But this does not do justice to the mappings
we observe. The variability that we see in
the mappings of words to world is con-
strained by perception. Even though the
precise segments selected by different lan-
guages vary-limb versus upper arm, lower
arm, etc-the terms pick out constrained
spaces. Visual discontinuities (and other
perceptual cues) can help in categorizing
body parts. At the same time, the cross-
linguistic variability we see in the meaning
of body part terms suggests that different
parts of the body are open to interpretation,
making the system of meaning associated
with body part terms partially arbitrary.
Individuals have to learn the linguistic con-
ventions of their community to determine
which of these discontinuities are relevant
for the language they are learning. The
externalized words, or signs, of a language
help provide a way of coordinating
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individual representations so that of the
myriad different solutions they could
adopt, speakers within a community can
come to a common solution for referring
to the body (Belpaeme & Steels, 2005).
Thus members of each language community
must learn a system that in part is
grounded in perception and in part is a
function of local interpretation.
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Notes
1. This conforms rather nicely to Wierzbicka's
(2007) analysis of head, according to which
ROUND is an important component of the
meaning of head.
2. The criterion is srronger than this; rhe unitary
meaning should be explicated in "an indepen-
dently justified set of semantic primes"
(Wierzbicka, 2007, p. 30).
3. This is cognate to the Jahai kuy.
4. Thanks to Nicole Kruspe for kindly providing
these examples.
5. If necessary, phrasal expressions can be used to
specify whether the arm or the leg is inrended-
tau furi me (literally 'lower/west limb') and tau
vego me (literally 'upper/east limb'). (East-up
and west-down are commonly conflated in the
languages of the Solomon Islands.) But in
common discourse, the general term tau is used
without further specification.
6. These languages form counterexamples to the
proposed universal by Andersen (1 (78) that lan-
guages make more distinctions for the upper
body than the lower body.
7. See de Vignemont et al. (200':!) for evidence that
action unifies body parts.
8. Another example from Cruse (1986) serves to
further illustrate this point. There were vurns
on his fingers entails There were bums on
his hand. However, there were burns on his
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PLATE 1. Three different languages and how they name parts of the body (A-C). A gray geon means that
there is no conventionalized means for talking about that body part. So, for example, in Jahai there is no
word for HEAD, TRUNK, ARM, or LEG. Within a language, geons with the same color are referred to with the
same word. Thus Lavukaleve speakers use tau to refer to ARM and LEG. Note that while Lavukalave
names body parts at level B, Jahai names at level C and Punjabi names at all levels suggesting that
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PLATE 2. Eight Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian speakers were asked to color in parts of the body. Their
responses were then layered into a single image so that points of consensus could be viewed. The darker
the image, the more speakers colored in that part of the body; the lighter the image, the fewer who
included that part. These are the results when Dutch speakers were asked to color in the arm, Japanese
speakers the ude, and Indonesian speakers the langan. (See Figure 3.3)
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